



Ex-post evaluation of the effects of the EU ETS on specific industrial sectors

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
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Outline

- Snapshot of heavy industry developments 1981-2005
- Evaluating the effects of the EU-ETS Phase I:
 - Methodology
 - Industry sectors
- Preliminary assessment
- Conclusion and policy messages

Industrial output growth: 1981-2005

Main products / world regions



➔ A reality: most of the growth in energy-intensive industries has been and will be outside Europe (e.g. local infrastructure needs, cheaper energy or raw materials)

How significant is carbon leakage?

Ex ante simulations

- Carbon leakage rates vary
 - Iron and steel:
 - ◆ 55% @ USD21/tCO₂ tax in Japan and the EU-15
 - ◆ From 0.5% to 25% @ EUR20/tCO₂ price EU-27
 - Cement: between 40-70% @ EUR20/tCO₂ price EU-27
- Methodological uncertainties abound
- CO₂ prices are not reflective of future CO₂ targets

Ex post assessments

- Monitoring costs and price changes
- Monitoring trade flows and investment decisions
 - ➔ Measurable impact of CO₂ cost?

Sources: *Gielen et al 2002, Demailly et al 2006 and 2008, Ponssard et al 2008, Reinaud (forthcoming), Reinaud and Quirion (forthcoming), Lacombe 2008, Walker and Quirion (forthcoming)*

Any evidence of leakage in aluminium? (2005-2007)

● Effects on trade flows?


- No statistical impact of CO₂ cost ... but:
- Most smelters under long-term electricity contracts – limited exposure to wholesale price increases
- Booming international aluminium market – reopening of a smelter in Germany, still profitable in spite of higher electricity prices

● Today's situation probably a poor indicator of tomorrow's

- Termination of long-term electricity contracts
 - ◆ New contractual arrangements: how important will CO₂ cost be?
- Possible inclusion of aluminium emissions in EU ETS

Source: Reinaud, forthcoming

Estimated electricity cost variations in primary aluminium (1999-2006)



How much of the increase is linked to CO₂ vs interruption of long-term contracts?

Any evidence of leakage in aluminium? (2005-2007)

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
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Short and long positions by sector, EU25, 2005-2007



Source: Mission Climat et al. (2008) sourcing the CITL database

Other sector: ex-post impact assessment

- Steel (IEA and CIRED)

- Largely over-allocated EUAs (+17.5%): EUA as a new cost factor?
- Change in trade flows driven by consumption increase

Trade flows

- Cement (UCD and CIRED)

- Little change in market prices yet small evidence of price increase (Ponssard and Walker 2008)
- Limited evidence of change in trade flows
 - ◆ Growth of imports limited in comparison to 1997-2002 growth
 - ◆ Consumption is the driving factor for imports (France is an exception)

Profits

- Refinery sector (MIT) Lacombe (2008):

- No structural change in trade flows
- Surplus of allowances
- If impacts, high margins – difficult to “see”

Investments

Time dimension is of critical importance

Summary of the preliminary assessment

- No statistical evidence of a change coinciding with the introduction of the EU ETS
- Great differences btw sectors ...
 - Trade intensity
 - EU-ETS costs: emissions intensive vs. electricity intensive sectors
 - Allocation
- ... but some common features across these activities
 - High price environment for industrial commodities
- Yet, Phase 1 is a poor indicator of what may come
 - More stringent targets (i.e. higher CO₂ prices)
 - Not enough time to see investment decisions change

Concluding remarks

- How significant could the carbon leakage problem be?
 - Do not speculate: simulate and monitor expected effects
 - ◆ Short term = changes in international trade flows
 - ◆ Long run = changes in investments patterns
- Yet drivers of investment are multiple
 - EU sectors are not operating in a vacuum
- ➔ **Policy / modelling challenge:** properly defining the counterfactual scenario is critical for finding evidence of leakage
- Ambitious climate policy implies changing relative competitiveness of sectors, encouraging low-carbon innovations and preparing for new playing field
- ➔ **Policy challenge:** Balance prime mover advantage with risk of carbon leakage



Reinaud J. (Nov 2008)
***Issues behind Competitiveness
and Carbon Leakage***

Thank you

further questions?

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Compensating for increases in electricity costs?

- Having a clear idea of the role CO₂ prices play in electricity contracts: critical before considering compensating for increases in indirect CO₂ costs
 - **Regional features of European electricity markets:**
 - Annual supply contracts (ex. Italy and France)
 - Electricity purchased on the market every quarter trimester, or calendar year (ex. Scandinavia)
 - Regulated prices (ex. Spain)
 - Autogeneration (in all sectors)
- Electricity price increases do not necessarily translate into electricity cost increase**

For more information see Reinaud (2007)

Key Policy Messages

5 challenges for measures to address CL

1. The debate on CL = a second best policy option!
2. Need to **maintain a carbon price** signal in the economy
3. Aim to provide a clear **long-term signal for R&D** in covered sectors
4. Consider designing measures as **flexibly** as possible to avoid the lock-in of less efficient policies and commit to on-going assistance (int'l negotiations)
5. Need to be **transitional** in the case gvts decide on the usage of measures w/o sufficient empirical analysis on carbon leakage expected from a sector