


# Quality of offsets

Online debate by Florence School of Regulation

Lambert Schneider | 15 December 2020


# Quality of offsets at one glance



# Paris Agreement – A paradigm shift for internationally transferred offsets

- Markets should **enhance ambition**  
(flexibility / costs-effectiveness not in focus)
  - Ambitious baselines below BAU, consistent with NDCs
  - Shorter crediting periods
- **Overall mitigation in global emissions (OMGE)**
- Robust accounting
- Transparency
- Environmental and social safeguards
- Share of proceeds for **adaptation**


## Sharing of reductions




# Additionality

## Plausibility of additionality claims

**Joint Implementation (JI)  
Credits issued**



**Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)  
Credit supply potential 2013-2020**



⇒ **Limit eligibility to activities with high likelihood of additionality**

## Key issues for “Nature-based solutions”

- Ensure **non-permanence** through
  - Exclusion of activities with high non-permanence risks from crediting
  - Pooled buffer approaches with sufficient capitalization and diversification
  - Monitoring and compensation for reversals over a 100-year time horizon
  
- **Limit crediting** to activities where
  - Emission reductions can be clearly attributed to the intervention
  - Uncertainty of baselines and emission reductions is manageable
  - Significant global leakage is unlikely

## Article 6 accounting

- **Quantification of NDCs** in tCO<sub>2</sub>e
- **Authorization** of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs)
- **Single-year target** accounting
  - **Averaging:** simple but can lead to higher emissions and involves huge uncertainty how much countries can sell or need to buy
  - **Multi-year trajectories:** robust as long as trajectory is well defined
- Consistent use of **Global Warming Potential values** between linking partners and offset host countries
- **Infrastructure** for tracking and reporting on ITMOs and “corresponding adjustments”

# Implications for linking of ETSs

- **Offset quality** in one system matters for all linking partners
  - Swapping offsets for allowances provides access to all partners
  - Exception: limits on offset use are fully exploited by ETS entities, irrespective of linking
- **Article 6 accounting** important to facilitate NDC achievement
  - Linking of ETSs shifts mitigation between jurisdictions
  - Net effect can be accounted for through “corresponding adjustments” under Article 6.2
  - Article 6 accounting also needed for
    - Offsets imported from third countries
    - Offsets internationally transferred between linking partners

# Recommendations

- **Limit eligibility to**
  - Activities with high likelihood of **additionality**
  - Activities with reasonable **certainty in emission reductions** (e.g. no significant risk of global carbon leakage)
  - Carbon crediting programs that address **non-permanence** through well capitalized buffers over 100 years
- **Internationally transferred credits**
  - **Share emission reductions** with host Party and ensure **OMGE**
  - Pursue **transformative technologies** (no low-hanging fruits)
  - Use robust and conservative **multi-year accounting** trajectories

# Thank you for your attention!

## Related publications:

[What makes a high-quality carbon credit?](#) (with WWF and EDF)

[Environmental integrity of international carbon market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement](#) (Climate Policy)

[Double counting and the Paris Agreement rulebook](#) (Science)

[Accounting for the linking of ETS under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement](#)

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